"The Rule of the Sword" was first published in 1977 'to tell something of the story
of the West Papuans' struggle for cultural independence'. In the introduction Nonie Sharp
writes, "The discussion here attempts to do two things: firstly, to give some idea of what
it must be like to be a West Papuan, imprisoned within his or her own land, and secondly,
to bring into focus the interrelationships in the immediate area of which Australians, the
peoples of the Melanesian islands and those of Indonesia form a part."

It is a detailed insight into the problem which now also reveals how nothing much has changed
over the ensuing years, apart from statistics; and gives us a valuable insight into the present.

CHAPTER 4: THE PRODUCTION OF OPPRESSION

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The Production of Oppression

Double Bind for West Papuans

The Dutch East Indies was once compared to a necklace of emeralds. For the Indonesian state in the last seven years, West Irian has turned out to be truly the 'last emerald'. From the colonial days right up to 1970, West Irian was regarded as a 'profitless wasteland'. Even in 1969, the motive for its incorporation was almost entirely political. Yet the general tendency for base metal prices to rise meant that the copper, nickel and minerals known to be buried in 'inaccessible' mountains in West Irian, became valuable commercial propositions.

The rate and intensity of exploitation, especially in mining, oil, timber and fishing are such that West Irian is projected to become a major contributor to Indonesian government revenues over the next ten years.¹ By the late 1970s annual revenues for the two multinationals mining copper and nickel are expected to exceed the annual external subsidy to West Irian.²

The subsidy to West Irian is a relatively large one: by 1973 the province was the recipient of the highest capital input per person of any Indonesian province, with rates not far below those of Australia to Papua New Guinea. Yet neither rising revenues nor the high subsidy are being used to contribute to the welfare of the West Papuans. They are being used entirely to prop up the Indonesian economy. After 1963 special funds were injected into West Irian, notably through the Fund of the United Nations for the Develop- ment of West Irian (FUNDWI). Central government grants have been higher than those to more heavily populated provinces. But despite the stated intentions these funds have not helped to improve the material and social welfare of West Papuans. While grants from FUNDWI have included support for vocational schools, teacher training and university scholarships for Papuans (a minimum of 50 per cent),³ 51 per cent of funds have gone to communications, especially sea and air, while at least half the Papuan population will remain in contact with the administration only by foot or canoe.

The Indonesian government and its apologists active in the overseas media, who have been allowed access to West Irian since 1969, have attempted to project the image of total success in economic and political integration of West Irian into Indonesia's 'New Order'.⁴ In terms of gross domestic product that may be an accurate representation; for the West Papuan people economic growth and political 'reforms' have been calamitous at every level.

For West Papuans there is a double bind. On the one hand, the experience of contact with the Indonesian state for villagers who make up at least 85 per cent of the population has been one of coming to know a predator who makes inroads into their lands, encroaches on their food reserves and upsets the delicate balance with the environment which is essential to the maintenance of garden produce at subsistence levels. On the other hand, the Indonesian presence has closed up avenues for cash cropping or wage earning.

Like Papua New Guineans, most West Papuans are shifting horticulturalists, practising a form of slash-and-burn agriculture and living in stateless and autonomous segments based on kinship groupings of often no more than 100-150 people. In 1960, 93 per cent of villages had less than 300 inhabitants and almost 55 per cent less than 100. Their methods of gardening in the tropical rain forests, which unmodified can support perhaps one person per square mile, provide what one observer has described as "a sophisticated and even elegant means" of maintaining population densities which are high by any standards, without in any marked way upsetting the delicate balance of the ecosystem.⁵ Diet is primarily carbohydrate, the staple commonly being kau kau (sweet potato), taro and yams in the highlands and sago in the swampy lowlands. As in Papua New Guinea, the main dietary additive required is animal protein and in practice this is derived from fish, poultry or pork and increasingly in Papua New Guinea, from tinned meat or fish.

There are fewer and fewer ways of supplementing village diets through cash earnings and except for rice, which is subsidized, prices in the towns are exorbitant. Timber projects leading to de-afforestation, like the cutting down, despite village opposition, of pine plantations in the Baliem Valley to provide materials for government building projects, and the commercialization of fishing and crocodile hunting without regard for replenishment, are illustrative of the inroads being made into West Papuan food and other resources.⁶ There is little encouragement of facilities for cash cropping. A plan to grow cabbages commercially in the highlands for sale at Jayapura was a disaster. From the report that some villagers sell garden produce to missionaries in the highlands, who then sell them to middle-men, who then transport them to shops in the towns by taxi(!), one might infer that the initial price to villagers was very low.⁷ Jobs in the towns at all levels are increasingly being taken over by migrants from the provinces of Indonesia.